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Abstract 
While the extant literature on organizational trust repair has considered the 
agency and trust repair actions of individual organizations, it has neglected repair 
following trust-damaging events affecting specific industries. Drawing on the 
theory of strategic action fields we ask two research questions: (1) How do 
reputational scandals involving a few transgressing firms affect trust in the whole 
institutional field?  (2) Do the transgressing firms repair trust in the same way as 
the blameless ones in the same field? To answer these questions we investigated 
four cases of retail organizations that engaged in trust repair actions following a 
food safety scandal, two that were widely held to have transgressed, and two that 
were held to be relatively blameless.  We compared the trust repair strategies of 
both groups, finding that even the blameless organizations felt compelled to act to 
repair trust.  However, blameless organizations also sought to differentiate 
themselves from the transgressing ones by using specific strategies to restore 
trust.   
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Introduction 
 
‘We must all hang together or, assuredly, we will hang separately’. 
Benjamin Franklin (1776) 
 
How organizations deal with trust-damaging events has become a matter of widespread 
academic and practical concern (Barnett & Pollock, 2012).  The extant literature on 
organizational trust repair has attempted to address this concern by highlighting the 
importance of trust in organizations and by analysing the repair strategies that seek to 
restore trust once breached. Most studies focus on trust breaches and trust repair actions 
by one organization without properly considering the implications of this trust breach 
for the whole field. In other words, the majority of literature adopts an individualistic 
perspective, assigning organizations with the agency to act independently of the field in 
which the trust-damaging event occurs (Bachmann, Gillespie, & Priem, 2015; Dirks, 
Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).  Yet, neo-institutional theory would 
suggest that there are severe constraints on organizations acting independently of 
competitors to restore trust, especially when events affect more than one firm in an 
industry and there are highly interdependent organizational fields, e.g. common supply 
chains and undifferentiated markets (Ketchen, Jnr & Hult, 2007; Spender, 1989).  In such 
cases, Benjamin Franklin’s much-quoted aphorism about ‘hanging together’ is often 
applied. 
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We approached the empirical problem of trust repair from the perspectives of strategic 
action fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).  This led us to formulate two research questions 
concerning organizational trust repair: (1) How do reputational scandals involving a few 
‘guilty’ organizations affect trust in the whole institutional field? (2) Do the ‘guilty’ 
organizations repair trust in the same way as the ‘not-guilty’ organizations in the same 
field?    
 
Our study seeks to contribute to the literature on organizational trust repair by 
examining whether ‘hanging together’ is a necessary collaborative strategy for restoring 
the field to its former state, or whether firms can rebuild trust by ‘remaining true to 
themselves’ and drawing on different trust repair strategies to distance themselves from 
the field.   To do so, we analysed a major trust-damaging event associated with the actions 
of a small number of organizations in the food-retailing sector – the so-called 2013 
horsemeat scandal.  We examined the trust repair actions of two organizations, widely 
deemed to have transgressed, and compared and contrasted their strategies with two 
organizations that were generally held to be relatively blameless. Our findings indicate 
that the blameless organizations felt compelled to act to repair trust in the field of food 
retailing, but also sought to distance themselves from the transgressing ones by using 
different strategies to restore trust.  This scandal therefore offered an interesting test 
case for our theorizing on organizational trust repair. 
 
We begin by defining key concepts used in this study and the trust repair literature, 
exploring  the ways in which the theory of strategic action fields may assist understanding 
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the behaviour of organizations faced with a trust breach.  Next, we outline the methods 
of our study, followed by our findings.  Finally, we discuss their relevance for the broader 
understanding of organizational trust repair. 
 
Trust and trust repair  
Trust remains an elusive and complex concept (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; 
Seppänen, Blomqvist, & Sundqvist, 2007). However, four definitions stand out, judged by 
the number of citations the papers where these definitions were proposed received (as 
per Google Scholar at the time of writing) and by how often trust scholars use them in 
their research. These are the definitions developed by Moorman, Deshpandé, and 
Zaltman (1993), Moorman et al. (1992), Morgan and Hunt (1994), Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman (1995), and Rousseau et al. (1998). According to Moorman et al. (1993, p. 82), 
trust is “a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence”. 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 23) define trust as a trustor’s “confidence in an exchange 
partner's reliability and integrity”. In the context of organization studies, Mayer et al. 
(1995, p. 712) define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. 
Similarly, Rousseau et al.'s (1998, p. 395) cross-disciplinary definition of trust is “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. In this study we use the cross-
disciplinary definition of trust developed by Rousseau and colleagues (1998). We define 
trust repair as firm’s efforts to ensure trust recovery (e.g., Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; 
Gillespie, Hurley, Dietz, & Bachmann, 2012). 
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Trust repair: Theory and prior research  
Research on trust has a rich background with seminal works dating to the 1960s (e.g. 
Deutsch, 1958; Erikson, 1965; Fox, 1966; Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1963; Rotter, 1967). 
Theory and research on trust can be grouped into the following areas: antecedents of 
trust; processes of building trust; consequences of trust; and lack of trust, distrust, 
mistrust and repair (Lyon, Möllering, & Saunders, 2012; 2015). For example, prior 
research on trust, in this journal, explored various facets and roles of trust including: 
diagnosing trust (Hatzakis, 2009); trust as the mediator variable underlying the 
relationship between participative leadership and organizational commitment (Miao, 
Newman, Schwarz, & Xu,  2013); the moderating properties of trust (Squire, Cousins, & 
Brown, 2009); trust and its role in corporate reputation (Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson, & 
Beatty, 2009); downsides of developing trust (Thorgren & Wincent, 2011); the 
breakdown in the trust relationship (Woodward & Woodward, 2001); and relationship 
quality and trust (Schoefer & Diamantopoulos, 2009). However, while it is well known 
that trust is a dynamic phenomenon involving various acts: initial trust development, 
growth, maintenance, trust breakdown and repair (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998), research on trust repair is a relatively under-explored and recent phenomenon. 
 
Research on trust repair has become the focus of scholars from various business-related 
academic disciplines including organization studies (see Bachmann et al., 2015; Kramer 
& Lewicki, 2010 for review) and marketing (see author, 2017, for review). While insights 
into trust repair from one discipline might not travel well to other disciplines and across 
different levels of analysis (Bachmann, Gillespie, & Priem, 2015; Donaldson & Preston, 
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1995; Freeman, 1984; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Pirson & Malhotra, 2011), most of the 
theory and research is underpinned by similar logic and assumptions. 
  
The first of these assumptions is that the literature on trust repair is replete with claims 
made about the benefits of trust for firms. From a firm’s perspective these typically 
include: competitive advantage, customers’ loyalty, commitment, cooperation and high 
turnover (e.g. Barney & Hansen, 1994; Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992; Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, & Sabol, 2002; Tax, Brown, & Chandrashekaran, 
1998); improvement in job satisfaction, increased job performance and employee 
commitment (Deluga, 1995; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Robinson, 1996); and reduction in 
transactional costs (Bromiley & Cummings, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1993). These 
benefits may be lost when trust in an organization is lost, for example, through accounting 
frauds, deceit, incompetence, fatal avoidable accidents, exploitation of vulnerable people, 
and massive compulsory job losses and bankruptcies (Bachmann et al., 2015; Gillespie & 
Dietz, 2009). The loss of trust is said to trigger negative effects including loss of 
competitive advantage, consumer and employee rage, disappointment, and reduced 
loyalty and commitment (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Kramer & 
Pittinsky, 2012).  
 
The second assumption is that when trust is broken it needs to be repaired by the 
organization, which then opens doors to investigation into how best to repair trust after 
a transgression. The literature on trust repair examines a range of substantive and 
symbolic trust repair tactics used by organizations: apology; denial; promises; 
explanations; accounts; restructuring; penance; compensations; rules, policies and 
controls; cultural reforms; public inquiries; hostage posting and involvement/use of third 
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parties (certification, memberships, affiliations and endorsements). These can, alone or 
in combination, lead to various degrees of trust recovery for stakeholders, such as 
employees and customers (e.g. Bachmann et al., 2015; Eberl et al., 2015; Fuoli, van de 
Weijer, & Paradis, 2017; Gillespie, Dietz, & Lockey, 2014; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; 
Mueller et al., 2015; Spicer & Okhmatovskiy, 2015; Stevens et al., 2015; Xie & Peng, 2009; 
Yu, Yang, & Jing, 2017). Trust repair mechanisms that underpin trust repair actions and 
their effectiveness include: sense-making, relational approach, regulation and controls, 
ethical culture, transparency and transference (Bachmann et al., 2015; Dirks et al., 2009).  
A third assumption underpinning much of the organizational trust repair literature is that 
organizations are relatively uncoupled from organizational fields and national business 
systems, and that they usually possess significant agency to repair trust. Much of this 
literature neglects the impact of national and industrial logics, culture and scripts on 
organizational actions (Thornton et al., 2013), which is the domain of field theory in 
management and organizational studies.  This lack of consideration of the embeddedness 
of organizations in a broader institutional field, in our view, constitutes a major weakness 
of current trust repair research. We turn to the theory of strategic action fields to explain 
how institutional theory may throw innovative light on this trust repair. 
 
Strategic action fields as a theoretical frame for analysis 
In contrast to earlier versions of institutional theory that focused on ‘settled times’, the 
theory of strategic action fields, proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2011), has greater 
potential to account for the period of change and upheaval.   This approach has its origins 
in social movement studies and organizational theory, and draws on Giddens’ idea of 
structuration and Bourdieu’s accounts of habitus, field and capital. Strategic action fields 
are the units of collective action in society. Fligstein and McAdam defined them as ‘a 
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meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with 
knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of 
the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s 
rules’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011: 3). The concept of a strategic action field is in some 
ways similar to that of a sector, an organizational field, a network or a policy domain. The 
membership of a strategic action field is subjective rather than based on any objective 
criteria, and it is constructed on a situational basis. It may be the case that agents are 
normally seen as competitors, but when a crisis happens, they can form a new field.  So, 
the emergence of a new issue can lead to the creation of a new strategic action field that 
transcends traditional field ‘fault lines’. 
 
The theory of strategic action fields takes cognizance of the relative position that actors 
occupy in the field, and acknowledges that some actors may have more power than 
others.  Those with power and influence are referred to as incumbents, while the less 
powerful take the role of challengers. To assess their own position and the position of 
others, actors use interpretive frames, and when some make moves others make 
adjustments;  hence strategic action fields are always in flux.  
 
Fligstein (2001) defined strategic action as an attempt by social actors to create and 
maintain stable social worlds by securing the cooperation of others, and may include 
identities, coalitions and interests to control actors. Unlike other perspectives in new 
institutionalism that focus on routine and reproduction (Feldman, 2000; Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003; Feldman, 2016), strategic action fields arise together when new issues 
emerge (such as a scandal that threatens the trust in an industry and the organizations 
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within it), which we define as the social appropriateness or desirability of the ideas and 
actions of an entity.   
 
Strategic action field theory concerns itself with the notion of social skill, which allows 
actors to develop a cognitive capacity for interpreting people and the action frames 
within which they collectively mobilize. This social skill requires that actors have the 
ability to forego their self-interest and consider the interests of multiple groups in order 
to gain support for a shared understanding of an exogenous shock, a field rapture or the 
onset of contention. Under the conditions of uncertainty or crisis within a field, a new 
shared sense of power relations governing the field emerges. This state of uncertainty 
leads to skilled strategic action by actors, which involves building coalitions between 
either dominant groups (incumbents) or challenger groups.  In such situations firms often 
feel compelled to become isomorphic to each other by acting in the same way to create a 
common front.  These isomorphic tendencies, however, do not always sit comfortably 
with actors’ simultaneous needs to differentiate themselves from others in the field, 
which our data illustrates. Before discussing our findings, we outline the methodology of 
our study. 
 
Methodology 
To address our research questions, we used a case study methodology (Yin, 2013), well 
suited for exploring what happened in a particular situation (Yin, 2013). This 
methodology helped us investigate in detail the dynamics of a trust repair process within 
a particular context and offered holistic explanations (Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2013). We 
conducted four in-depth case studies and constructed a detailed narrative of the trust 
repair processes of Tesco, Asda, Waitrose and Morrisons. These four cases were selected 
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on the following grounds. Tesco and Asda were directly implicated in the horsemeat 
scandal, and we labelled them as transgressing organizations. Morrisons and Waitrose 
were indirectly implicated through spillover effects, and we labelled them as ‘blameless’ 
organizations. In addition, we also had rich documentary evidence pertaining to the trust 
repair efforts of these retailers. Overall, these four cases offered extensive potential for 
understanding and gaining insight into their organizational trust repair efforts.  
 
Empirical context 
We draw on a recent food safety scandal in the UK in which many food retailers were 
found guilty of selling mislabelled meat products. This mostly refers to beef-related 
products that were found to contain horsemeat, an anathema to British consumers who 
usually do not eat such meat.  As a consequence, consumers lost trust not only in food 
retailers because of the deception in food labelling, but also in the health and safety 
protocols and retailers’ overly complex supply chains (BBC, 2013 a, b; Food Standards 
Agency, 2014; Harris Interactive, 2013a, b). For example, a survey commissioned by The 
Food Standards Agency (UK) and conducted by Harris Interactive (2013a) showed that 
67% of those ‘who intended to buy less’ would do so because of lack of trust. There 
evidence suggests that the horsemeat scandal had an impact on all retailers: processed 
meat sales dropped significantly across the UK, there was a marked increase in the sale 
of vegetarian meals, and a larger than usual number of people turned to a vegetarian diet 
(Neville, 2013). Food safety tests were carried out across the sector and, although only 
some retailers were found to sell contaminated meat, the whole sector suffered the effects 
of the loss of trust. The research on negative spillovers (e.g. Votola & Unnava, 2006) might 
offer some explanation as to why all major UK retailers were ‘tarred by the same brush’. 
Like the reactions by employees following a breach of trust as theorized in Gillespie and 
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Dietz’s (2009) study, the customers of UK retailers could be described as having suffered 
from hyper vigilance and paranoia.  
 
Data collection 
We collected publicly available data pertaining to the trust repair efforts of each studied 
retailer. Our aim was to identify all the organizations’ trust repair strategies and to create 
a factual timeline of trust repair because of its processual nature (Mohr, 1982, Langley, 
1999). To this end, we searched for relevant information in UK newspapers and media 
sources spanning a one-year period. These included: The Guardian, Financial Times, The 
Telegraph and the BBC News. We also analysed the implicated retailers’ press releases 
and information pertaining to trust repair published on their websites, as well as reports 
on the scandal published by the Food Standards Agency (UK), the British Retail 
Consortium, Harris Interactive, Ipsos MORI, Kantar Worldpanel, and Which? These 
documents enabled us to construct a rich and accurate description of organizations’ trust 
repair efforts. In addition, they enabled data triangulation.  
 
Data analysis 
We analysed the collected data in two stages. Stage 1, collected data were first organized 
chronologically into four narratives of trust recovery of each studied retailer (Appendices 
A–D). Stage 2, we used open coding (Charmaz, 2006, 2014; Glaser, 1978) that involved 
analysis of the narratives line-by-line and interpretation of each line of text. This enabled 
us to arrive at the meaning underpinning each fragment (line of text) of analysed data. 
Open coding enabled us to stay open to potentially new discoveries. In addition, our 
coding was also guided by trust repair strategies identified in prior trust repair literature 
(e.g. Bachmann et al., 2015; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).  
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To ensure rigour, we followed Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) trustworthiness criteria (i.e. 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability). We read collected data 
multiple times, which ensured close familiarity with the content. To enable 
transferability, we described the empirical context in which trust damage and recovery 
took place. Also, an analytical diary, systematic data management with NVivo 10 and data 
triangulation were central to our analysis.  
 
Findings 
We found that after the horsemeat scandal both the transgressing (Tesco and Asda) and 
blameless retailers (Waitrose and Morrisons) felt compelled to act. Appendices A–D list 
key trust repair actions taken by the four studied retailers and show that all firms 
engaged in these activities over similar time periods. Table 1 sums up these trust repair 
actions and provides a comparison.  
 
TRANSGRESSING ORGANIZATIONS BLAMELESS ORGANIZATIONS 
Tesco’s trust repair 
action/frequency 
Asda’s trust repair 
action/frequency 
Morrisons’ trust repair 
action/frequency 
Waitrose’s trust repair 
action/frequency 
Ongoing beef product DNA testing required by the UK government 
Frequent reporting of negative results from their product testing 
Showing understanding of the importance of their customers’ trust 
Minimizing the fact that 
their supply chain is very 
complex and 
international (e.g. ‘we 
already are the biggest 
customer of UK 
agriculture’) 
Withdrawing products as a precautionary measure  
Increasing supply of 
meat from local 
producers located in the 
UK 
Stating that their supply chain is relatively simple and that it involves local meat 
producers 
‘Closing ranks’ (Retailers signed a joint letter stating: (1) they could not accept a 
situation whereby customers’ trust could be compromised by fraudulent activity 
or even an international criminal conspiracy; and  (2) they will do whatever to 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
 
restore public confidence, and they are working around the clock to resolve the 
problem) 
Publicly acknowledging the problem and their 
involvement in the scandal 
Demonstrating ongoing commitment to and support 
for UK farming 
‘Minimizing the problem’ Highlighting their good knowledge of their supply 
chain and emphasizing full traceability of meat 
Announcing greater commitment to UK farming Demonstrating quality/appropriateness of their 
supply chain and product testing 
Proactive in their commitment to reform their 
internal control systems and their supply chain 
 
Assuring customers that their products are correctly 
labelled  
 
 
Promising more frequent and top-quality testing of 
their supply chain and supplied food 
Reassuring the public that they only source meat 
from local beef producers (100% British) that they 
know and have a good relationship with 
Enabling communication with their customers 
 
Informing their customers that their meat sales 
increased and thereby implying that other 
customers trust them 
Openly communicating about on-going business 
restructuring with stakeholders 
Product withdrawal of Findus lasagna (due to 
horsemeat) 
Divesting themselves from implicated meat 
suppliers/placing new requirements on implicated 
suppliers 
Opening-up of supply 
chain/ ‘opening the 
black box’ (i.e. in videos 
published by the BBC, 
Morrisons showed their 
production facilities and 
methods of production. 
Morrisons highlighted 
that: (1) meat comes 
from their own abattoir; 
(2) various details are 
shown on the meat 
declaration: UK origin, 
traceability information, 
date of slaughter; (3) 
even minced beef can be 
traced back to its origin) 
Noting that their 
‘products are made 
according to their high 
standards and 
separately from other 
companies’ products’ 
Committing themselves to restoring customers’ 
trust  
Pointing out that their 
staff working with meat 
are knowledgeable 
about these products 
(e.g. ‘traditional’ 
expertise in meat 
production; butchers in 
their stores trained in 
traditional way) 
Announcing a 
construction of their 
own frozen meat 
company 
Explaining to the public details pertaining to the 
scandal/ongoing plans and reforms 
Stressing their passion 
for traditional British 
meat and that they even 
have their own farms 
Highlighting that buying 
cheap meat products 
also poses a risk to the 
consumer 
Announcing investigation into the issue 
 
Pointing out that they 
have their own farms 
and abattoirs (‘no 
middle man’) 
Announcing that they 
‘always worked more 
closely with farmers 
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than any other 
supermarket’ 
Going an extra mile (e.g. product testing beyond the 
FSA requirement) 
Withdrawing Findus 
lasagna (due to 
horsemeat) 
Highlighting the 
importance of animal 
welfare 
Promising change of business practice  Highlighting integrity of 
their business 
Showing full commitment of resources to address 
the cause of the incident and prevent a recurrence 
Pointing out that their 
staff working with meat 
are knowledgeable 
about these products 
(e.g. ‘traditional’ 
expertise in meat 
production; butchers in 
their stores trained in 
traditional way) 
Emphasizing high quality 
of meat and their 
business conduct 
Offering refunds Stressing their passion 
for traditional British 
meat and that they even 
have their own farms 
Noting that their 
‘products are made 
according to their high 
standards and 
separately from other 
companies’ products’ 
Withdrawing mostly their own product brands (due 
to horsemeat) 
Pointing out that they 
have their own farms 
and abattoirs (‘no 
middle man’) 
 
Apologizing Highlighting the 
importance of animal 
welfare 
Highlighting that buying 
cheap meat products 
also poses a risk to the 
consumer 
Recognizing wrongdoing/violation of social norms 
 
 Announcing that they 
‘always worked more 
closely with farmers 
than any other 
supermarket’ 
Opening-up of supply 
chain/ ‘opening the 
black box’ (e.g. installing 
cameras in their meat 
production facilities to 
show what kind of meat 
goes into their products; 
building a dedicated 
website where they 
published results of their 
product tests and other 
improvements) 
   
Table 1: Comparison of key trust repair actions by transgressing vs blameless organizations 
 
Transgressing organizations and trust repair 
Our analysis of transgressing retailers’ trust repair actions enabled us to identify several 
activities used in an attempt to repair consumers’ trust. At the beginning of the horsemeat 
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scandal transgressing retailers publicly acknowledged the incident, apologized for their 
wrongdoing and violation of social norms, and withdrew implicated products. Asda 
started with precautionary product recalls, while Tesco published an acknowledgement 
and customer apology in a full-page advert in several UK national newspapers. Similarly, 
an Asda spokeswoman stated that the company was sorry about the problem and any 
inconvenience caused to their customers. Both retailers engaged in divesting themselves 
of implicated meat suppliers or placing new requirements on these suppliers. For 
example, Tesco ended its contract with Silvercrest with immediate effect on the 30th of 
January, and with Comigel on the 11th of February. After these initial actions Tesco and 
Asda fully committed themselves to restoring customer confidence by investigating the 
causes of the scandal, and vowed to leave ‘no stone unturned’ in the scrutiny of their 
supply chains.  
 
At the same time, the two transgressing firms engaged in ongoing product testing and 
frequently reported their findings. Once it became clear that the underpinning reasons 
for the scandal were retailers’ overly complex supply chains (involving many 
international suppliers and sub-suppliers), lack of appropriate traceability mechanisms 
and shortfall in effective product testing procedures, the retailers announced their 
commitment to changing things. Their aim was to make their supply chains simpler, to 
use more local meat producers and to improve their control of suppliers and products. In 
addition, Tesco stated that they would set a new benchmark for the testing of products. 
Both retailers also encouraged communication with customers and other stakeholders in 
order to ensure transparency of their operations.  To this end, Tesco opened their ‘black 
box’ pertaining to their meat processing. For example, they installed cameras in their 
meat production facilities to show what kind of meat goes into their products. In addition, 
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they also launched a food news website (tescofoodnews.com) offering the public 
information, such as the number of tests performed and their results, the timeline of 
events related to the scandal and their promise to change operations. 
 
Blameless organizations and trust repair 
Interestingly, comparison of the trust repair actions of transgressing vis-à-vis blameless 
retailers shows that there was significant agency among blameless organizations to 
distance themselves and restore trust.  We found that while blameless organizations 
shared some actions with transgressing retailers, mostly their actions differed. This could 
therefore be construed as a differentiation strategy that blameless firms pursued in order 
to distance themselves from transgressing retailers. This strategy played on the 
weaknesses of transgressing retailers (real and perceived by the public) and on 
increasing understanding of the underpinning causes of the scandal (e.g. overly complex 
supply chains; poor product testing and traceability of meat). For example, overly 
complex supply chains were at the heart of Tesco’s and Asda’s involvement in the scandal. 
So, both Morrisons and Waitrose tried to distance themselves by stressing their high 
product quality controls as well as the top class, uncomplicated and locally based nature 
of their supply chains. Indeed, Morrisons pointed out multiple times that their supply 
chain is short, does not include ‘a middle man’ and involves their own farms (located in 
the UK) and abattoirs. For similar reasons, Morrisons and Waitrose stated their on-going 
commitment to high quality meat and support of UK farming (something the 
transgressing organizations were lacking). Their close familiarity and good relationship 
with local meat producers also played an important role in their attempt to distance 
themselves from transgressing firms.  In addition to these trust repair actions both 
blameless retailers offered assurances to their customers that their products are 
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correctly labelled and that they sell only 100% UK beef. Finally, Morrison’s and Waitrose 
reported an increase in their meat sales thereby implying that customers trust them and 
that they have correctly labelled products. 
 
While these findings outline similar attempts by blameless retailers to differentiate 
themselves from transgressing retailers, we note that there were also slight differences 
in their approaches. On the one hand, to differentiate themselves from other retailers, 
Morrisons was especially focused on their expertise in meat production, their own short 
supply chain (ownership of meat producers and abattoirs) and the traditional knowledge 
of their staff selling meat. For example, three weeks into the scandal, Morrisons 
commissioned television commercials to show customers that: (1) they like to source 
meat from farmers they know; (2) they have a passion for traditional British meat and 
even have their own farms; (3) they only use British beef; (4) and the butchers in their 
stores are trained the traditional way. At the same time, Morrisons also made sure they 
reminded their customers about the main cause of the scandal – a complex meat supply 
chain. On the other hand, Waitrose placed their emphasis on the high quality of their meat 
and business conduct, which resonated with their premium market positioning and their 
business orientations. They highlighted that buying cheap meat products poses a risk to 
consumers and that the welfare of animals and the quality of fresh and frozen meat is of 
the highest priority. They also emphasized how they have ‘always worked more closely 
with farmers than any other supermarket’ (BBC, 2013).  
 
Interestingly, comparison of the actions of transgressing and blameless retailers reveals 
that while blameless organizations largely pursued a differentiation strategy to distance 
themselves from transgressing retailers, there is also some evidence that they worked 
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together to rebuild customers’ trust. For example, they ‘closed ranks’ by signing a joint 
letter stating: (1) they could not accept a situation whereby customers’ trust could be 
compromised by fraudulent activity or even an international criminal conspiracy; and (2)  
they will do whatever to restore public confidence, and they are working around the clock 
to resolve the problem. Furthermore, they all engaged in precautionary product 
withdrawals and extensive product testing. Figure 1 distils our findings in a theoretical 
model. 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
Discussion 
We sought answers to the following questions: (1) How do reputational scandals 
involving a few ‘guilty’ organizations affect trust in the whole institutional field?  (2) Do 
the ‘guilty’ organizations repair trust in the same way as the ‘not-guilty’ organizations in 
the same field?  In response to the first question we found that both the transgressing and 
the blameless organizations acted to repair trust in the field of food retailing, which runs 
counter-intuitive to the individualistic organizational trust repair literature (Bachmann 
et al., 2015; Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).  
 
So how can this situation be explained? Why would someone who did not break trust feel 
that they have to repair it? Institutional theory offers some explanation with its rendering 
of the institutional field. Referring back to Fligstein and McAdam’s (2011: 3) words, we 
argue that both types of organizations operate within a strategic action field and ‘interact 
with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the 
purposes of the field’. In times of crisis, both blameless and transgressing organizations, 
who in normal circumstances are competitors, feel their individual self-interests are best 
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served by collective action to protect or defend their field (Riaz et al, 2015). An alternative 
to concerted strategic action is a possible demise of the field, hence Benjamin Franklin’s 
quote at the start of this paper is particularly relevant. ‘Hanging together’ requires that 
actors to have the ability to forego their self-interest and consider the interests of 
multiple groups in order to gain support for a shared understanding of the situation. But 
this understanding only occurs when an exogenous shock takes place and destabilizes the 
field – in our case the horsemeat scandal. In this respect our analysis points to the 
complexity and partial inter-dependency of organizations within the field, an area 
previously not studied by trust repair scholars. 
 
In contrast to the extant literature on organizational trust repair, which focused on trust 
repair strategies by one organization, we considered the implications of this trust breach 
for the whole institutional field. This ‘hanging together’ phenomenon is one that trust 
repair researchers often overlook as they focus almost exclusively on the transgressors 
and their attempts to regain trust.  In the institutional field, relatively blameless 
organizations endure spillover effects, whereby their trustworthiness suffers because of 
the actions/inactions of transgressing organizations.   In our study the blameless retailers 
engaged in trust repair activities because the scandal affected all retailers, blameless or 
otherwise, and left consumers unsure who to trust, as was evidenced by so many turning 
to vegetarianism (BBC, 2013b; Food Standards Agency, 2014). 
 
In addressing our second research question we found that the actions taken by the 
blameless and the transgressing organizations had some similarities. We found that the 
two transgressing organizations – Tesco and ASDA – engaged in trust repair actions 
which resonate largely with the strategies discussed in prior literature on trust repair 
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(Bachmann et al., 2015; Dietz & Gillespie, 2012; Dirks et al., 2009; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; 
Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). For example, these organizations publicly acknowledged the 
incident and withdrew some products from the market. They also pursued product 
testing and communicated the results of the tests to their customers and the public. They 
also apologized and offered explanations, committed to reform of their internal control 
systems, and promised closer regulation of their supply chains (Bachmann et al., 2015; 
Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Also, Tesco’s and Asda’s emphasized greater transparency of 
their processed. Moreover, we also identified a novel response not evident in existing 
literature on the topic.  This response we labelled ‘downplaying the problem’. For 
example, one month into the scandal, Tesco downplayed the problem by issuing a 
statement that ‘the scandal has had minimal effect on their sales’. Similarly, Andy Clarke, 
Asda’s CEO, said: ‘It's fair to say trust was dented. There was some marginal sales impact 
initially, but we've seen that recover. We are back to where we were’ (The Guardian, 
2013). This strategy was pursued during and towards the end of the scandal. Our data 
suggest that this downplaying of the problem was used to reduce the importance of the 
mislabelling issue, to positively assure consumers and to signal to consumers that the 
issue was addressed. In a similar fashion to transgressing retailers, blameless retailers 
engaged in precautionary product recalls, product testing, communication with 
customers, frequent reporting of negative product testing results, and showing 
understanding of the importance of their customers’ trust. 
 
While sharing some common features with the transgressing firms, the actions by the 
blameless organizations also differed in two key respects. We found that the blameless 
organizations largely sought to distance themselves from the transgressing by using 
strategies to restore trust specific to them. Morrison’s predominantly pursued a 
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differentiation strategy that stressed their traditional knowledge in meat production, 
relatively short and local meat supply chain and their full knowledge and good 
relationships with farmers. Waitrose’s trust repair strategy involved differentiation from 
other retailers based on their knowledge and full control of their supply chain and their 
premium market positioning.  
 
Thus, we argue this need for organizations to act in concert to restore the trust in the field 
had to be balanced by the needs of blameless organizations to differentiate themselves 
from transgressing organizations.  In this respect, the blameless organizations took 
advantage of the situation by laying claims to a degree of uniqueness. The blameless 
organizations could be seen to be using particular kinds of organizational stories 
(Deephouse, 1999, 2005), and selling a positive version of the story of how their 
organization dealt with external obstacles by acting consistently with their values.  Yet, 
as Caza, Moss and Vough (2017) argue, being true to oneself involves dealing with 
multiple demands and identities, which suggests that firms will sometimes follow 
consistent actions, but at other times pursue divergent or differentiated approaches to 
restoring trust. Following the food contamination scandal discussed here, the blameless 
organizations engaged in actions aimed at repairing trust, but also ensured that their 
actions differed from the trust repair strategies used by the transgressing organizations.   
 
Although the use of multiple case studies instead of a single case study provides a 
stronger base for more generalizable theoretical insights (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), 
our findings may not be generalizable in all industry contexts. As with all inductive theory 
building, generalizing the findings for other situations must be done with care. 
Nevertheless, we think that this study’s findings can be used for ‘naturalistic 
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generalization’ (Stake, 1978) and are transferable to other similar contexts (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985). For example, it is fair to suggest that following the scandals in the car 
manufacturing industry (such as the VW emissions scandal or the Toyota faulty brakes 
scandal), many actors in the field came together to tighten up compliance with industry 
standards. 
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